In this article I read Elaine Scarry's account of torture in her The Body in Pain (1985) 
tradition knows that the voice comes from "the vibration of a throat of flesh" and, precisely because it knows this, it catalogues the voice with the body. The voice becomes secondary, ephemeral, and inessentialreserved for women (2005: 6) .
In For More than One Voice and much of her other work, Cavarero attempts to disrupt this partitioning of the human (with its concomitant privileging of Man) not simply by claiming that women are in fact the possessors of speech, but further by insisting on the significance of the vocalic quality of phone , not only for women but for 'the incarnate singularity of every existence insofar as she or he manifests her-or himself vocally' (ibid. 7). Cavarero's central concern is to stress that 'logocentrism radically denies to the voice a meaning of its own that is not always already destined to speech' (ibid. 13).
Cavarero argues that prior to any communication of semantic content the voice first communicates the uniqueness of the person who is vocalising: 'the truth of the vocal [...] proclaims simply that every human being is a unique being, and is capable of manifesting this uniqueness with the voice, calling and infecting the other, and enjoying this reciprocal manifestation' (ibid. 6-7). Cavarero's account of uniqueness is drawn directly from that of Hannah Arendt (1998: 176) and is a fundamental component of her theoretical project. Although the status of uniqueness and its relationship to the human cannot be fully explored in this article, critical questions will be raised towards this article's end which trace the limits of Cavarero's account of uniqueness, particularly as it relates to Cavarero's claim that voice is 'destined to speech ' (ibid. 13 ). For now it should be noted that the status of uniqueness maintains an ambivalent relationship to the human: on the one hand uniqueness disarms a generalised conception of the human by insisting on each existent's concrete materiality; while on the other uniqueness, as proper to every human, is in danger of reproducing precisely this generality.
For Cavarero, uniqueness is consistently overlooked by a tradition that both only regards phone to the extent that it is the vehicle for semantike and further is committed to the theorisation of Man in general, rather than particular, non-generalisable men, or women, or many others. As Cavarero argues, even in lines of research 'dedicated to dependent on semantike , but further by privileging the visuality of semantike over the orality of phone :
[w]hat we call "signified" is, in fact, for metaphysics an object of thought that is characterized by visibility and clarity. The problem here is not only the relation between the realm of thought and that of speech, nor is it simply the usual metaphysical privileging of thought over speech. Rather, at stake is the fundamental gesture that locates the principle of the system of signification, of the signified, in the visual sphere (ibid.).
Cavarero continues: '[m] etaphysics has always dreamed of a videocentric order of pure signifieds. Verbal signification is, from its perspective, a hindrance -especially when it unfolds acoustically in vocal speech ' (ibid. 40) . Logos ' ambivalent structure, referring both to reason and to voice, is collapsed, or always in the process of collapsing, towards the 'noetic' (ibid. 39) realm of knowledge governed by the static metaphors of vision and away from the dynamic metaphors of sound. The flesh of the body, and the sonority of sound from which reasoned speech can never escape, is effaced; logos is devocalised.
The devocalisation of logos becomes an especially pressing issue given that, as has been already indicated, logos plays a crucial role for Aristotle in distinguishing Man from other animals. The distinction rests on the possession of speech in the former, and this is central to Man's status as a properly political animal:
[Nature] has endowed man alone among the animals with the power of speech. Speech is something different from voice, which is possessed by other animals also and used by them to express pain or pleasure (Aristotle 1992: 60) . 3 This account, and in particular Aristotle's separation of voice and speech, has been central to the conception of the human as it has been inherited in the western tradition (Bourke 2011: 7, 29-60; Rancière 1999: 1-19; Agamben 2007: 3-11) . Cavarero notes that, following Aristotle, '[t] he voice prior to speech or independent of speech is therefore simply an animal voice -an a-logic and a-semantic phonation ' (2005: 34) . This is important when we consider Scarry's arguments concerning torture. For Scarry, when one suffers extreme pain one's capacity to deploy language -unequivocally the semantike of logos ' signifying voice -is destroyed. There is something crucial to pain that, for Scarry, 'actively destroys ' (1985: 4) language, 'bringing about an immediate reversion to a state anterior to language, to the sounds and cries a human being makes before language is learned' (ibid.). When thought through Aristotle's schema, in torture the semantike of logos is stripped away leaving nothing but phone ; pure voice. It should be noted that the 'purity' of this desemanticised voice can already be called into question. As Joanna Bourke has demonstrated, to claim that pain robs speech of its semantic component is to ignore a plethora of counter-examples: in Bourke's words, 'the same people who declare their suffering to be "unspeakable" or "absolutely evanescent" may then go on to tell their story of pain in exquisite detail ' (2014: 28) .
Pain, notes Bourke, is 'inherently social' (ibid. 46): it is not an isolated experience within a person, as Scarry maintains, but rather emerges as a consequence of sociality. It is on this basis that Bourke charges Scarry with falling into the 'ontological trap' (ibid. 5) of conflating the metaphorisation of pain with with 'descriptions of an actual entity' (ibid.).
Rather than pain being an entity that carries ontological weight and resides within people -fundamentally inaccessible to others and, as a consequence, destructive of forms of communication -Bourke proposes that one thinks of pain 'as an event' (ibid.).
In this way one becomes a 'person-in-pain' (ibid.) through one's recognition, naming, and storying of one's pain, a process that 'can never be wholly private' (ibid. 6).
However, as Bourke herself notes when reading Jean Améry's account of being tortured (Améry 1976) , the 'extreme example' (Bourke 2014: 30) of torture is marked by 'incommunicability' (ibid.). In this way the hard distinction between pure voice and reasoned speech that has its roots in Aristotle is maintained in this article, not because it is deemed the correct account of pain, but because it has influenced understandings of extreme pain and thus can be mobilised to help make sense of them. Following Aristotle's schema, torture is concerned with the forcible separation of speech from voice and thus concerned with the violent resolution of the ambivalence of logos : that it reduces one to an animalistic state 'anterior to language'. Or, perhaps more accurately, to an infantile state: unlike the animal, which is not presumed to have the capacity to possess the semantike of logos , the infant is understood as being 'destined to speech' (2005: 13) in Cavarero's words. As it will be argued towards the 4 end of this article, the conclusion that the body in pain is animal or infantile can be refuted using resources that Cavarero offers, and this despite Cavarero's insistence on voice's 'destination to speech' (ibid. 210) which would otherwise unwittingly bolster this conclusion. First, however, it is necessary to offer a more detailed reading of Scarry's account of voice in the scene of torture. Scarry's account makes clear the crucial role violence plays in manifesting an understanding of Man as a disembodied, reasoning being, freed from an embodied voice and its associative lungs, throat and tongue, and necessarily actualised in relation to the violation of another. For Scarry, voice is important for two reasons: first, the torturer's voice objectifies the fact that the prisoner's voice has been, or is in a process of being, destroyed; second, the absence left by the stripping away of the language of the prisoner (the semantike of logos ) is filled, or perhaps rather colonised, by the torturer.
Scarry argues that as well as inflicting pain the torturer also objectifies the destruction of the prisoner's world. The torturer does this by juxtaposing their world against the 'small and shredded world ' (1985: 36) of the prisoner, and in so doing further contributes to the destruction of the prisoner's world. As Idelbar Avelar argues, ' [i]n the modern technology of torture the moment of interrogation is constitutive of the infliction of pain ' (2004: 31) . Interrogation may be a common way of enacting this objectification, but it is not the only way. As Scarry says, '[t]he confession is one crucial demonstration of this absent world, but there are others ' (1985: 38) . These include the torturer's 'weapons, his acts, and his words' (ibid.); that is, the fact that he exists as an embodied, relational being, extending himself out into the world. The interrogation is a performative gesture, a particular strategy which exploits, bears witness to and objectifies the disjuncture between the world of the torturer (marked by myriad forms of self extension) and the world of the prisoner (which for Scarry extends barely beyond the surface of the prisoner's body). As Scarry argues, 'for the prisoner, the body and its pain are overwhelmingly present and voice, world, and self are absent; for the torturer, voice, world, and self are overwhelmingly present and the body and pain are absent' (ibid. 46). For Scarry there is thus a direct relationship between the prisoner's voice, self and world, and that of the torturer: the torturer instrumentalises the prisoner's deconstructed world to enlarge their own sense of world (and the regime that the torturer may represent): as Scarry says, '[i]t is only the prisoner's steadily shrinking ground that wins for the torturer his swelling sense of territory' (ibid. 36).
One can see, then, the intimate relationship between the fetishisation of To assent to words that through the thick agony of the body can be only dimly heard, or to reach aimlessly for the name of a person or a place that has barely enough cohesion to hold its shape as word and none to bond it to its worldly referent, is a way of saying, yes, all is almost gone now, there is almost nothing left now, even this voice, the sounds I am making, no longer form my words but the words of another (1985: 35) .
What is most apparent here is the separation of logos ' phone semantike . Voice, or phone , is stripped of any capacity for signification it previously had; voice becomes 'the sounds I am making' which 'no longer form my words'. Crucially, however, the vocality 
106-115).
What these examples indicate is that proper to horrorism is the destruction of the uniqueness of a person, often as it is expressed through the body (although it will be suggested that the body is not the central condition for an occurrence of horrorism), and that it is enacted on the helpless; that is, those who have no capacity to defend against it.
As a form of violence, horrorism 'offends the ontological dignity that the human figure possesses' (ibid. 9). Its principal target is the singular uniqueness of the human, which for Cavarero is most evident in the destruction of the body, particularly the head and face (ibid.). Horrorism is a 'violence whose precise aim is to erase singularity' (ibid.
19). In this sense the killing of the human is incidental to horrorism, even as it so frequently accompanies scenes of horror:
As its corporeal symptoms testify, the physics of horror has nothing to do with the instinctive reaction to the threat of death. It has rather to do with instinctive disgust for a violence that, not content merely to kill because killing would be too little, aims to destroy the uniqueness of the body, tearing at its constitutive vulnerability. What is at stake is not the end of a human life but the human condition itself, as incarnated in the singularity of vulnerable bodies (ibid. 8).
Cavarero goes on: 'it is not so much killing that is in question here but rather dehumanizing and savaging the body as body, destroying it in its figural unity, sullying it [...] nullifying human beings even more than killing them' (ibid. 9). Torture, for 11 Cavarero, typifies this most clearly: '[t]he dead body, no matter how mutilated, is only a residue of the scene of torture' (ibid. 31). The horror of torture also makes clear, for 12 Cavarero, that what is proper to horrorism is its enactment on the 'helpless' or the 'defenseless' (ibid. 30):
[d]efenseless and in the power of the other, the helpless person finds himself substantially in a condition of passivity, undergoing violence he can neither flee from nor defend against. The scene is entirely tilted toward unilateral violence. There is no symmetry, no parity, no reciprocity.
As in the exemplary case of the infant, it is the other who is in a position of 11 Cavarero here, as in many other places, is indebted to Hannah Arendt's analysis of the Nazi concentration camps and the killing of man's 'uniqueness' (Arendt 2003: 134-137) . See also Cavarero's 'Narrative Against Destruction' (2015a: 4-5). 12 As Cavarero notes, torture's etymology lies in the latin torquere : 'to twist and distort the body ' (2011: 32) . Torquere itself is linked to tortum , a wrong or injustice; cf. tort law, or Jacques Rancière's tort , translated as 'wrong' in the English versions of his Disagreement (Rancière 1999: 21; Panagia 2006: 91) . Interestingly, the French supplice that Foucault draws on extensively in Discipline and Punish (1991) , translated into the English as 'torture', is rooted in the latin supplicium , which signifies kneeling in supplication, as well as torture, punishment and suffering. 'Supplication' is rooted in the latin supplicāre , the plicāre meaning 'to bend'. So both examples of the infliction of suffering -torquere and supplicāre -are linked to a torsional force, a twisting or bending, where the body comports itself in response to an outside power: either in deference (to bend one's knee) or in pain.
Importantly, in torture this is a manufactured helplessness: unlike the infant, who of necessity is vulnerable and helpless, the helplessness of the one subjected to torture is 'produced artificially [...] In this sense, torture belongs to the type of circumstance in which the coincidence between the vulnerable and the helpless is the result of a series of acts, intentional and planned, aimed at bringing it about' (ibid. 31).
The example of torture makes clear that while it is the violation of the helpless body that most frequently and visibly arouses repugnance, what is significant is that it is the singular uniqueness that this body avows that is at the heart of the scene of horror.
This is important as for Cavarero, while the body (and especially the face) is an exemplar in exhibiting the singular uniqueness of the human, so too is the voice, not and further that this uniqueness can be accounted for without recourse to the voice's 'destination to speech' (ibid. 210), as it has previously been suggested in this article.
What becomes clear in Cavarero's reading is that uniqueness is most apparent when freed from the proper name; that is, when it is communicated through voice, as is the case in Shakespeare's balcony scene where, shrouded in darkness, 'the dialogue unfolds between two people who do not see one another' (ibid. 237). Juliet recognises Romeo's uniqueness by his voice, 'beyond the name itself, beyond speech and even beyond language' (ibid. 238). Romeo's name, although it 'evokes uniqueness' (ibid.), in fact interrupts who Romeo is by focusing instead on what he is; that is, Romeo is a
